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Bradley E. Tinker 
 
 In Maralex Resources v. Barnhardt, Maralex and property owners 
brought an action to protect private property from BLM inspections of oil 
and gas lease sites. The Tenth Circuit looked at the plain meaning of a 
congressional statute and held in favor of Maralex, finding that BLM 
lacked authority to require a private landowner to provide BLM with a key 
to inspect wells of their property. The Tenth Circuit held BLM has the 
authority to conduct inspections without prior notice on private property 
lease sites; however, it is required to contact the property owner for 
permission before entering the property. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Maralex Resources Inc. v. Barnhardt, both property owners and 
lessees challenged the United States District Court for the District of 
Colorado decision allowing the United States Bureau of Land 
Management (“BLM”) to freely access oil and gas lease sites on private 
property, and  moved for a judicial review of the decision under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).1  Several parties compromised the 
plaintiffs in this case, including Maralex, and families: the O’Hares; the 
Kenners; and the Rowses (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).2 The land is owned 
by the Southern Ute Tribe (the “Tribe”) and the three families of 
Plaintiffs.3 Plaintiffs brought this action against the Secretary of the 
Interior, the United States Department of the Interior, and the United States 
(collectively, “Defendants”).4 The central issue of the case was whether 
BLM has the authority to access wells located on private property at will.5 
Plaintiffs argued BLM lacked the authority to freely conduct inspections 
of wells on private property because of congressional statutes and 
regulations protecting private property.6  
The Tenth Circuit interpreted the authority of BLM to inspect oil 
and gas wells located on private land under the Federal Oil and Gas 
Royalty Management Act of 1982 (“FOGRMA”) and supporting 
regulations.7 Under FOGRMA, BLM has the authority to inspect oil and 
gas wells on federal and tribal land.8 However, FOGRMA is silent on 
BLM’s authority to access lease sites on private land, and therefore 
includes some inherent ambiguity about BLM access to private land.9 
                                                     
1. 913 F.3d 1189, 1191–92 (10th Cir. 2019). 
2. Id. at 1192. 
3. Id.  
4. Id.  
5. Id. at 1189. 
6. Id. at 1194. 
7. Id. at 1189, 1201. 
8. Id. at 1200. 
9. Id.  
2 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 0 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The property at issue in this case is a 320-acre parcel of land in 
southwest Colorado, in which property owners leased out the mineral 
rights for their separate tracts.10 The first lease was issued by the Tribe in 
1984 under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, for the exploration 
and development of oil and gas.11 The lease was approved by the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, and under 30 U.S.C. § 1718(b), BLM had the right to 
inspect the wells on site because the land belonged to the Tribe.12 The two 
remaining tracts were leased to Maralex and SG Interests III, Ltd. (“SG”); 
one was leased collectively by the three families, and one was leased 
individually by the O’Hares.13  
In 1996, Plaintiffs, SG, and the Tribe entered into a 
communitization agreement (“CA”) which stated that the production of 
minerals produced would be allocated to the interest owners in proportion 
to the amount of property owned.14 This agreement stated the parties had 
agreed “that the Secretary of the Interior, or [their] duly Authorized 
Officer” would supervise the oil and gas production.15 The CA’s language 
was used in conjunction with  FOGRMA, which authorizes representatives 
to enter the lease sites without advanced notice for lease site inspections 
on federal and Indian lands.16 BLM interpreted this language to mean it 
can supervise and inspect the wells—even those on private land—to 
ensure proper security and measure production.17 
Maralex controlled four oil wells located on two tracts from leases 
on the O’Hares’ private property.18 BLM wished to conduct site 
inspections on the wells and contacted Maralex and the O’Hares for 
property access, which was denied.19 BLM then issued four Notices of 
Incidents of Noncompliance (“INC”) because Maralex and the O’Hares 
declined to “‘permit properly identified authorized representatives’. . . ‘to 
enter upon, travel across and inspect lease sites . . . without advance 
notice.’”20 Maralex and the O’Hares appealed the INCs and sent a letter to 
BLM arguing it only had authority to conduct annual inspections of their 
wells.21 They argued that BLM’s request to have a key to freely access 
their private property was beyond the authority of BLM and violated their 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.22 In August 2013, BLM’s Deputy 
State Director for Energy, Lands, and Minerals, Colorado State Office, 
                                                     
10. Id. at 1192–93. 
11. Id. at 1192. 
12. Id. at 1193 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1718(b)). 
13. Id. at 1192. 
14. Id. at 1193. 
15. Id.  
16. Id. at 1200 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1718(b)). 
17. Id. at 1194. 
18. Id. at 1193. 
19. Id. at 1193–94. 
20. Id. at 1194 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 3162.1(b)). 
21. Id.  
22. Id.  
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reviewed the letter and promulgated a point-by-point response disagreeing 
with Maralex’s annual inspections arguments.23  
After receiving the response letter from BLM, Maralex appealed 
the BLM decision to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (“IBLA”), which  
affirmed the INCs.24  Plaintiffs then brought suit in district court because 
the IBLA failed to address the issues of whether BLM can require a key 
to gate locks.25 The district court affirmed the IBLA decision, allowing 
BLM to access the lease sites without advanced notice.26 The decisions of 
the BLM State Director, IBLA, and the district court each failed to address 
whether BLM can require the land owners or well operators to provide a 
key to access lease site gates or if BLM can use its own lock on the gates.27 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
The Tenth Circuit analyzed the extent of BLM authority by 
evaluating the plain language of the statute and the proper deference owed 
when the statute is silent or ambiguous.28 Two additional issues in this 
appeal were: (1) whether Plaintiffs waived their argument that BLM 
lacked authority to access lease sites, and requiring Plaintiffs to give BLM 
a gate key or allow it to place its own lock for immediate access was 
proper; and (2) whether BLM had authority via statutes and regulations to 
require Plaintiffs to supply BLM with a key or lock for unfettered access 
to lease sites.29    
 
A. Chevron and Waiver of Claims  
 
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court decision by applying 
the test from Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, and found 
no ambiguity in the applicable statute’s language, thereby declining to 
defer to the agency’s decision and instead following the statute’s express 
intent.30 The Tenth Circuit then addressed whether Plaintiffs waived their 
argument that BLM lacked authority to immediately access private 
property, either by a key to locked gates or by placing a BLM lock on the 
gates.31 Because this argument was not specifically addressed in Plaintiffs’ 
initial appeals of the INCs, the district court declined to analyze the issue.32 
The Tenth Circuit looked at both the IBLA briefs and the CA, which both 
deny that BLM has unbridled and unlimited access to conduct inspections 
                                                     
23. Id. at 1194–95 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 101(b)). 
24. Id. at 1195. 
25. Id.  
26. Id. 
27. Id.  
28. Id. at 1199–1200. 
29. Id. at 1195–96. 
30. Id. at 1198–99 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)). 
31. Id. at 1196. 
32. Id.  
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without notice.33 An order was issued to show cause to whether BLM 
would continue to seek access, and the BLM confirmed they would.34 
 
B. BLM Authority 
 
BLM interpreted FOGRMA and the CA as the source of its 
authority to inspect lease sites.35 FOGRMA states: 
 
Authorized and properly identified representatives of the 
Secretary may without advanced notice, enter upon, travel 
across and inspect lease sites on Federal or Indian Lands 
and may obtain from the operator immediate access to 
secured facilities on such lease sites, for the purpose of 
making any inspection or investigation for determining 
whether there is compliance with the requirements of the  
mineral leasing laws and this Act.36 
 
FOGRMA gives authority to BLM to inspect the federal or tribal lands.37 
The CA provides that the Secretary of the Interior, or authorized officer 
shall have the right to inspect “all operations within the Communitized 
Area” to the same extent that the Tribe is a lessee governed and regulated 
by the Department of the Interior.38  
 The Tenth Circuit found that authorized representatives of the 
Secretary may conduct inspections of a lease site without advanced notice, 
but authority needs to be specified to do this on private land.39 Because 
FOGRMA was silent to the authority given to access privately held land, 
statutory directives in 43 C.F.R. § 3161 were used to interpret BLM 
authority to access property.40 The Tenth Circuit cited the regulations that 
stated agencies have the authority to inspect “all wells and facilities on 
State or privately owned lands committed to a unit or communitization 
agreement, which include Federal or Indian lease interests.”41 The CA was 
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, and allows annual inspections 
when the applicable wells are producing in significant quantities, or when 
sites have a history of noncompliance with federal law.42  
The Tenth Circuit found that the authority to conduct annual 
inspections does not construct a limitation, but only a minimum for 
allowed inspections; therefore, BLM had authority to inspect the wells 
                                                     
33. Id. at 1197. 
34. Id. at 1196. 
35. Id. at 1200. 
36. Id. (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1718(b)). 
37. Id.  
38. Id. at 1193. 
39. Id. at 1201–02 (citing 43 C.F.R.§ 3161.3). 
40. Id. at 1201. 
41. Id. (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 3161.1(b)). 
42. Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. § 3161.3(a)). 
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without prior authorization.43 Using the language of the regulations, a 
property owner or operator is not required to supply a key to access a lease 
site on private land, or to allow BLM to install its own lock on a gate.44 
However, when the lease site is on privately-owned lands, BLM must first 
seek entry from the land owner or well operator to afford them entry to 
conduct lease inspections.45 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals focused on the 
extent of BLM’s authority to access private property and held BLM has 
the authority to access private property. However, courts must balance the 
interests of private property owners against government interests. This 
holding required BLM to get entry approval to access private property 
lease sites. Without this holding, BLM would have interpreted its own 
authority to extend to practically unfettered access to private property in 
order to conduct inspections when federal or Indian land is involved with 
the lease.  
 
                                                     
43. Id. at 1203 (citation omitted). 
44. Id. at 1204 (citing 30 C.F.R. §§ 3163.1(a)(5), 3163.3). 
45. Id.  
